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Mr. Peabody’s Improbable Legal Intellectual 
History 
MARK FENSTER† 
INTRODUCTION 
You may recall Mr. Peabody, a cartoon dog who had his 
own segment on Rocky & His Friends and The Bullwinkle 
Show. Mr. Peabody was the smartest being alive, the 
enormity of his erudition matched only by that of his ego. He 
spent each segment teaching his rather stupid boy Sherman 
about history by transporting them both back in time via the 
WABAC (pronounced “wayback”) machine he invented. The 
histories he walked into are fractured, as per the perverse 
logic of Jay Ward studio cartoons of that era, the studio that 
also produced Fractured Fairy Tales as a repeating segment 
in the same shows. The irrepressible and resourceful Mr. 
Peabody typically intervened to preserve history as we 
currently understand it from the foolish proclivities of the 
presumably great, but in fact flawed, historical figures that 
he and Sherman found in the past. Great men only became 
great because the great historian Mr. Peabody made them so. 
In a pre-postmodern take on the historian’s craft, the cartoon 
posited that history does not simply recognize great men—it 
transforms commoners into them.1 
Although his historical method challenged and even 
disrupted historical knowledge, Mr. Peabody did not engage 
in the history of ideas; his interest lay entirely in world-
historical events that he found through his WABAC machine 
and that he manipulated to track the historical record. The 
foolish, confused, and often cowardly people he found could 
not contemplate or fully understand their own place in 
history, much less the ideas that surrounded them, while Mr. 
  
† Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Hazouri & Roth Tort Professor, Levin College of Law, 
University of Florida. Thanks to Jack Schlegel and Rachel Rebouché for 
suggestions. 
 1. A recent film adaptation revived the same main characters and the 
WABAC machine, and relied upon the same general storyline. MR. PEABODY AND 
SHERMAN (DreamWorks Animation 2014). 
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Peabody was no more interested in intellectual or ideological 
context than the audience for his cartoons—even the 
audience for cartoons written to humor both children and 
adults. But the animated sequences that always introduced 
and concluded each Mr. Peabody and Sherman episode offer 
a character who I think represents the work of legal 
intellectual historians, and especially their relationship to 
those lawyers and legal academics who attempt to make 
substantive arguments about the present on the backs of the 
truncated version of the past that they tell. Herewith, a 
description of the opening sequence:  
A trumpet sounds; flags introducing a parade appear. Two proud 
horses bearing knights in armor and blankets with the word 
“PEABODY’S” lead the parade; three identical lumpen Robin Hood-
era soldiers on foot follow; then a Cleopatra-like figure borne by 
four Egyptian servants on a bed festooned with the word 
“IMPROBABLE”; then three goofy African-like savages with 
spears; then a solider riding an elephant wearing a blanket with 
the word “HISTORY”; then Mr. Peabody and Sherman in a humble 
chariot pulled by a fearsome horse; then three lovely maidens 
leaping, absurdly pulling the petals off of flowers. Bringing up the 
rear is a lone street sweeper who cleans the petals (and, implicitly, 
the excrement that the animals must have produced). 
Legal intellectual history, I suggest in this Paper, is the 
street sweeper in the parade of law’s history and its use of 
history. Lawyers and legal academics want great, important 
figures, cases, and theories with and against which they can 
do battle. The student-edited law reviews prefer bold, clear 
claims that explain why one answer to an historical question 
presented will bring justice, while a competing answer is 
manifestly unjust; why one past approach lacks principle or 
created worse consequences; or how one theory or another 
can explain all manner of thorny legal issues which bedevils 
academics and practitioners. Viewing an appellate decision, 
legislative enactment, or academic debate, the legal academic 
must travel back in time to set matters straight, redeeming 
the past to make certain that the future avoids its confused 
and unfortunate fate.  
Intellectual historians trail behind the legal academy’s 
heavy-breathing and magnificent use of the past, cleaning up 
its waste by providing context, complicating narratives, and 
replacing bright trumpet horns with muted tones, vivid 
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colors with shades of gray. Well after the parade has 
dispersed and marchers have moved on, and often before the 
next “Big Issue” causes the celebrants to line back up, 
intellectual history can bring complexity and context back in 
to the frame. I illustrate this dynamic first by describing the 
use of legal realism in Brian Tamanaha’s recent monograph 
on what he describes as the formalist-realist divide in legal 
theories about judging and about legal doctrine, and in the 
debate over that divide.2 In Part II, I describe a relatively 
minor figure in the pantheon of legal realists (as that 
pantheon currently exists), Thurman Arnold, and his realist 
critique of the criminal law and procedure. 
I. INSIDE THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE 
Tamanaha’s central purpose in Beyond the Formalist-
Realist Divide is to correct the present tendency, which he 
traces to Grant Gilmore’s enormously influential The Ages of 
American Law3 and to the Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”) 
movement,4 to make vast overstatements about what judges 
who worked during the “classical era” believed and how 
committed they were to the beliefs they held.5 The prevailing 
historical narrative of doctrinal development and judges’ role 
in it presents a straight, progressive line of change from the 
foolish innocence of legal formalism to the wise experience of 
legal realism and realism’s aftermath.6 Tamanaha argues 
there was no such thing as “formalism,” the view that law is 
autonomous, comprehensive, logically ordered, and 
determinate, with judges applying that law mechanically to 
  
 2. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE 
(2010). 
 3. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). 
 4. A footnote on the relationship between legal realism and CLS could either 
be very long or mercifully brief. I choose the latter path. Duxbury’s description of 
CLS’s early days and its roots in various realist traditions and debates seems as 
good as any. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 435-50 
(1995). 
 5. See TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 17-21, 60-62. 
 6. See id. at 1-3. 
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the dispute before them.7 Realists and their later 
interlocutors—arguing in their strongest statements that the 
law is indeterminate, filled with gaps, exceptions, and 
contradictions, applied by judges who decide cases based on 
intuition, ideology, or personal preference—overstate their 
departure from the past as they sought to distinguish 
themselves.8 The traditional narrative of discontinuity and 
transformation is unsound and unsupportable.9 Legal 
theories and approaches to the study of judicial behavior 
based upon it merely repeat the error. 
Tamanaha offers in its stead a tale of functional 
continuity in common law judging under the rubric “balanced 
realism.”10 Judges decide easy cases by the nearly mechanical 
application of existing rules and harder cases through a more 
complex process that considers the standards of the 
community.11 In their institutional roles, judges therefore 
balance the two approaches of formalism and realism—
hence, “balanced” realism.12 Tamanaha provides an 
impressive and, at times, overwhelming inventory of judicial 
commentaries made during the “classical” or “formalist” era 
that recognize the gaps, uncertainties, and evolving nature 
of the common law and judges’ active role in making it.13 The 
approach that emerges from these general statements about 
the judicial process proves far more complex than the term 
“mechanical jurisprudence” that Roscoe Pound attributed to 
the era and that continues to be oft-repeated today.14 At the 
same time, however, he substitutes the reduction he has 
found with another one: reducing a century’s jurisprudence 
into the platitudes espoused by judges’ platitudinous 
statements about what they do in the abstract. The neat 
  
 7. Id. at 14-63. 
 8. See id. at 67-108. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 6-7. 
 11. See id. at 186-96. 
 12. See id. at 125-41, 197-99. 
 13. Id. at 28-51. 
 14. See generally Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 
605 (1908). 
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package of formalism becomes the equally neat, if more 
palatable, package of balanced realism. 
My purpose in this Part is not to argue that Tamanaha 
is “wrong,” though, as with most clean and streamlined 
historical arguments, he gets some particulars incorrect or 
describes them incompletely, and he creates straw figures 
that he can easily tear apart. Reviews and mentions of his 
book attempt to separate the good from bad and the accurate 
from the overstated, and interested readers should consult 
them rather than this Paper for fuller consideration of his 
argument’s merits, especially for contemporary legal 
theory.15 Nor am I concerned that the balanced realism he 
promotes is at so abstract a level of generality to be 
thoroughly banal—even though it surely is, as Brian Leiter 
argues.16 I want instead to probe the narrative structure of 
Tamanaha’s history, to see how it fits into certain kinds of 
academic and professional arguments that pervade the legal 
literature and what it might tell us about the value, if there 
is any, of legal intellectual history.17 
Indeed, if stated without the trappings of a legal brief 
and polemics, Tamanaha’s history is largely correct. Of 
course realism’s theory of law and judging did not emerge 
fully grown from nothing in the early twentieth century; of 
course a common law system produced cases and 
commentary that resist the stultification and implications of 
an excessively static, formal system of law. As Al Brophy has 
explained in his review of the book, Tamanaha was not the 
first to note this.18 Over the past several decades, intellectual 
  
 15. Compare Alfred L. Brophy, Did Formalism Never Exist?, 92 TEX. L. REV. 
383 (2013) (reviewing and challenging Tamanaha’s book for its historical 
account), and Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the 
Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111 (2010) (questioning aspects of the book’s historical 
narrative and challenging its substantive jurisprudential theory), with Edward 
Rubin, The Real Formalists, the Real Realists, and What They Tell Us About 
Judicial Decision Making and Legal Education, 109 MICH. L. REV. 863 (2011) 
(articulating a much more positive review of the book). 
 16. See Leiter, supra note 15, at 125-27. 
 17. On the role of narrative in history, see HAYDEN WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE 
HISTORICAL IMAGINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE (1973); HAYDEN 
WHITE, TROPICS OF DISCOURSE (1978). 
 18. See Brophy, supra note 15, at 388. 
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historians have added nuance to the picture that legal 
theorists and some legal historians have offered of 
“formalists.”19 But Tamanaha provides a useful and pointed 
rejoinder to legal theorists and jurisprudes that the simple 
narrative of the “Classical Era Before Realism” is in fact more 
complex than a bunch of silly men in robes expounding on the 
wonders and beauty of legal rules.20 Of course, as he notes, 
the academics denominated as “realists” constituted 
themselves as distinct from previous generations and 
contemporaries by establishing the narrative in the first 
place.21  
The question of why they did so does not appear to 
interest Tamanaha. When he confronts the question of who 
and what these people were, he vacillates. Sometimes he 
acknowledges some thin notion that they “shared [a] 
skeptical take on the role of law in judging”;22 he makes 
statements and repeats arguments from others 
acknowledging diversity among the realists;23 and he even 
suggests that “realism” might have sprung whole cloth from 
private correspondence between Llewellyn and Pound, and 
never emerged except in their imaginations.24 He also 
considers who the realists themselves were, though not in 
great detail.25 There were no card-carrying members or 
official meetings; their membership was contested, and some 
who clearly espoused “realist” ideas (like Leon Green) 
pointedly refused the label.26 Their interests and 
  
 19. See, e.g., KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA, 1790–1900: LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM (2011); DAVID M. 
RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC TURN 
TO HISTORY (2013); Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century Legal 
Thought, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1431. 
 20. See TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 28-51. 
 21. Id. at 17-18 (noting that Llewellyn and Pound, as well as Gilmore, 
established the narrative). 
 22. Id. at 70.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 69-71. 
 25. See id. at 71-74. 
 26. Id. at 69. The full story of Pound and Llewellyn’s correspondence reveals 
the essentially random quality of the exercise. See N. E. H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND 
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methodologies varied, and while a core of them were in the 
early-middle of their academic career and approximately the 
same age during realism’s heyday, they were as diverse in 
personality and temperament as one might expect of such a 
non-diverse group of white, male law faculty.27 Tamanaha 
fails to offer a solution to the mystery of why the narrative 
began in the 1930s, rather than the 1970s, and barely 
considers the possibility. Instead, the “what” question is his 
focus—what the realists and their later interlocutors said 
that contributed to the received narrative, and what the so-
called “formalist” judges said that undercuts it. 
To distill from this tendentious and contingent 
assemblage of ideas, methods, and human beings a narrow 
theory of adjudication, as Tamanaha (and the many other 
contemporaries to whom he is responding) does, is to perform 
the same historical transformation that he rightly critiques 
regarding “formalism” and “formalists.” Those associated 
with realism undertook their research and writing outside of 
Llewellyn’s mind and correspondence. They may have 
espoused similar ideas about, among other things, the role of 
judges, law’s politics, and law’s political consequences, but 
they did so to differing degrees and in different voices, while 
focusing on different doctrinal areas and asking different 
research questions. They also worked in different law schools 
scattered around the country (or, in Jerome Frank and Felix 
Cohen’s cases, in non-academic settings),28 and therefore 
within distinct intellectual communities, institutional 
pressures, and opportunities. To transform this group into a 
“movement” requires some degree of imagination; to reduce 
it to a few PowerPoint slides is to conjure an efficient theory 
out of a small sample of publications from a motley group of 
  
AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 173-222 
(1997). 
 27. A brief account both of the coherent story of “legal realism” and of its 
undermining in the actual history of institutions, events, and personalities, 
appears in JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 15-21 (1995). 
 28. On Frank’s career, see ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS 
REFORMER: JEROME FRANK’S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW (1985); on Cohen’s career, 
see DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE: FELIX S. COHEN AND THE 
FOUNDING OF AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM (2007). 
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individuals who were plenty busy doing other things, and 
then to claim that they all agreed with the simplification. 
The Sturm und Drang of that era begs for some 
explanation besides the arrogance or anxieties of a new 
generation of legal academics. If historical actors think they 
are engaged in an important intellectual project to overthrow 
an existing regime—and some of them at least clearly did—
they were not simply fudging the historical record when 
claiming they were correcting the mistakes of their 
predecessors. We should not take them at their word as if 
they are fair and objective historians; but nor should we 
assume they are fantasists creating myth out of whole cloth. 
They established a narrative about themselves, their 
forebears, and doctrinal development, and as with any 
scholarly claims—including Tamanaha’s—they produced 
that narrative in a particular institutional and political 
context. That narrative’s survival and ongoing salience, too, 
requires some consideration, as its success can no longer be 
the direct result of CLS’s rise and Gilmore’s bewitching 
prose, if in fact it ever was. The continuing predominance of 
the narrative is a fascinating mystery, but solving it would 
require a degree of nuance, sympathy, and symptomatic 
reading, as well as research into the primary sources that 
reveal institutional and personal history. It would require 
the hard work and thought of intellectual history that do not 
seem to interest Tamanaha. 
That those associated with realism presented an overly 
simplistic historical argument in their own platitudinous 
statements is no reason to believe what they said, to believe 
that they believed it, or to believe that their successors 
continue to believe it rather than merely repeat it 
unthinkingly as gospel. The predominant discontinuity 
narrative is at once a powerfully convenient story—powerful 
in its ability to distinguish between approaches, convenient 
in its ability to combine signifiers—and an historically 
reductive one. But so is Tamanaha’s continuity narrative. In 
place of the realists’ and their supporters’ vision of 
intellectual struggle (as opposed to an unspoken or not quite 
as voluble, actual political, generational, and institutional 
one), Tamanaha’s several parades of straw men dramatize an 
overriding genius-of-a-system common law tradition, one 
that can bear and incorporate intellectual struggles within 
2016] LEGAL DOCTRINE 109 
 
its capacious judicial process. Such parades are wonderful 
and useful, and they have sustained generations of 
intellectual debate among lawyers and legal academics. They 
continue to make teaching legal doctrine easier and more fun. 
They aid brief-writing and give the illusion of important 
stakes in otherwise sterile academic debates. They can even 
be called a kind of historical inquiry—after all, they 
demonstrate an interest in the past, and thank goodness for 
that. They can constitute a history of ideas and intellectual 
history of a thin sort. But they are neither careful, mindful of 
ambiguity, open to self-reflection and self-critique, interested 
in the complexity of institutions and individual biography, 
nor willing to seek out and confront contradictory sources. 
They are to history what philosophical debates among 
lawyers are to philosophy.29  
II.“REALISM,” REALISTS, AND REALISM’S MYTHMAKING: 
THE CASE OF THURMAN ARNOLD 
WABAC machine to 1930 or so. Thurman Arnold, whom 
Tamanaha lists as a prominent realist,30 arrived at Yale from 
the outer province of West Virginia (where he served as dean 
for a couple of years).31 He was hired first as a visiting 
professor to take part in Dean Charles Clark’s efforts to study 
the Connecticut courts.32 Arnold was not a typical legal 
realist, however.33 His tenure in the academy lasted less than 
a decade, and he rarely engaged in scholarly debates after he 
left.34 His prominent later professional career—as assistant 
attorney general in charge of antitrust enforcement, federal 
appellate judge, and then co-founder of a prominent D.C. law 
  
 29. Alas, self-issued licenses to practice history are cheaper than self-issued 
licenses to practice philosophy, which is a reflection of philosophers’ more 
successful and intensive efforts to police their discipline through obscure jargon 
and method. 
 30. See TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 94. 
 31. SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 39-44 (2005). 
 32. Id. at 43-44. 
 33. As if such a thing existed, stuffed and set in a diorama on the Yale campus. 
 34. The exception is an important one: Thurman Arnold, Professor Hart’s 
Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (1960).  
110 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
firm—overshadows his brief academic one.35 But he was an 
important figure at Yale when that school housed a large and 
prominent number of those associated with realism.36 And in 
cycling through the gamut of realist methodologies and 
perspectives, from quantitative empirics through doctrinal 
critique and legal theory, Arnold’s work both confounds and 
replicates Tamanaha’s historical narrative. His was a far 
more varied and polyglot “realism” that anticipated the 
intellectual moves of succeeding generations, even if it did 
not directly inform them. Like several other realists, his 
interest lay in questions besides judicial decision-making and 
legal form.37 
Nevertheless, Arnold imagined himself setting both the 
law and academic debate right, offering his arguments (and 
those of his compatriots) as the end of a fairly simplified 
historical progression of ideas. His storytelling thus 
resembles Tamanaha’s own mythmaking, as it does that of 
the endless parade of legal academics who invoke their 
historical forebears. To illustrate his work and considerable 
narrative abilities, I briefly summarize below Arnold’s work 
on criminal law and procedure, fields that were not at the 
core of what Tamanaha identifies as realism’s concerns. 
Arnold applied realist methods to reach distinct conclusions 
about the way forward for legal theory and reform.  
* * * 
Reporting on the empirical study on the criminal docket 
in the Connecticut federal courts he was engaged in with 
Dean Clark and the newly arrived William Douglas,38 Arnold 
  
 35. See generally WALLER, supra note 31, at 78-180. 
 36. LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960, at 137-43 (1986); 
Robert W. Gordon, Professors and Policymakers: Yale Law School Faculty in the 
New Deal and After, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL 75, 85-87 (Anthony T. 
Kronman ed., 2004). 
 37. I have extensively discussed Arnold’s work elsewhere. See generally Mark 
Fenster, The Birth of a “Logical System”: Thurman Arnold and the Making of 
Modern Administrative Law, 84 OR. L. REV. 69 (2005); Mark Fenster, The 
Symbols of Governance: Thurman Arnold and Post-Realist Legal Theory, 51 BUFF. 
L. REV. 1053 (2003). 
 38. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 27, at 86-88. 
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published a “progress report” in a 1931 issue of the A.B.A. 
Journal in which he used realist terms that emphasized its 
study of the “law in action,”39 while it rejected the formalist 
study of the “formation of principles.”40 Having obtained 
“mass statistics” of the actual procedures that courts used, 
the study found courts engaged in an “almost too efficient” 
process of overseeing plea bargains for prosecutions for the 
production, sale, and possession of alcohol under the federal 
Volstead Act.41 Like similar studies undertaken around the 
same time, Arnold and his collaborators had discovered the 
emergence of the modern system of criminal justice—the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion to avoid criminal trials.42 
Tamanaha and others marginalize the empirical strain of 
realism as strange and naïve, if they recall it at all. But it 
was in fact more important than jurisprudential realism to 
many of those identified with realism in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s, as well as to the deans at Yale and Harvard,43 
and it foreshadowed the academy’s current fixation with 
quantitative methodology as well as the longer-lived “law and 
society” interest in the close study of law in action.44  
Empirical work was ultimately not to Arnold’s liking, 
however, and he soon abandoned it for the speculative 
pursuits of doctrinal critique and his own brand of anti-
jurisprudential jurisprudence. And so, even before the 
completion of the Connecticut study, Arnold turned to 
substantive criminal law in an article titled Criminal 
  
 39. Thurman W. Arnold, Progress Report on the Study of the Federal Courts—
No. 7, 17 A.B.A. J. 799, 799 (1931). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. at 800, 801. 
 42. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 27, at 89. 
 43. While Dean Clark had recruited Arnold to Yale specifically because of the 
latter’s empirical work on West Virginia courts, Dean Roscoe Pound was 
attempting to woo Arnold to Harvard on the same basis—to join an empirical 
project he was sponsoring. See Letter from Thurman Arnold to Roscoe Pound 
(Jan. 23, 1931), in VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY: THE LETTERS OF THURMAN ARNOLD 
176-77 (Gene M. Gressley ed., 1977). 
 44. That the realists’ empirical methods are now viewed as primitive says as 
much about evolving, contingent means of unearthing truth through the 
collection of data and the numerical representation of that data as it does about 
the realists’ methodology.  
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Attempts—The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction,45 where he 
critiqued the case law and scholarship that attempted to 
explain and systematize a notoriously complicated and 
incoherent area of law.46 He attacked in particular the 
“formalist” Joseph Beale and the eminent criminal law 
scholar Francis Sayre, both of Harvard, who sought in 
different ways to construct a stable, mechanically applicable 
criminal attempts doctrine by categorizing culpable attempts 
and distinguishing the mens rea of inchoate acts and the 
theoretical consequences of non-actions.47 Beale and Sayre 
were not alone; a number of learned scholars had more 
recently sought to tame the doctrine through fine distinctions 
and categories.48  
To Arnold, all of these distinct but similar approaches led 
only to the rise of the “abstraction” to which the article’s title 
referred. They made little sense in theory and proved 
impossible to apply, and taken together they were part of a 
tendency towards “analytical thinking” and “search for 
abstractions” which had confused scholars and jurists for 
generations.49 Scholars and appellate courts could not make 
sense of the doctrine because its very principle made no sense 
  
 45. See Thurman W. Arnold, Criminal Attempts—The Rise and Fall of an 
Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53 (1930). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id.; see also J. H. Beale, Jr., Criminal Attempts, 16 HARV. L. REV. 491, 
491-92 (1903) (identifying four elements of the attempt crime: an act, the intent 
to “adapt[ ]” that step towards a purpose to complete the offense, nearness of 
success, and failure); Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 
821, 837-39 (1928) (consolidating Beale’s four elements into three: act, intent, and 
consequences, with intent playing the dominant role and the consequences of an 
attempt the least significant one). 
 48. See, e.g., John W. Curran, Criminal and Non-Criminal Attempts, Part II, 
19 GEO. L.J. 316, 337 (1931) (arguing that that an attempt merited criminal 
punishment to the extent that it breached the peace and thereby challenged and 
harmed the state’s authority); John S. Strahorn, Jr., The Effect of Impossibility 
on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 971 (1930) (arguing that the law of 
criminal attempt should focus not on act and intent but on the question of whether 
an attempt creates “a substantial impairment of some interest protected by the 
involved prohibitions against the crime or its related attempt”). 
 49. Arnold, supra note 45, at 59-60. 
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and had no boundaries.50 Indeed, Arnold argued, the absence 
of reported cases that consider the law of attempt, and the 
vanishingly small number of decisions that had relied on 
attempt as a standalone doctrine in the very recent past, 
proved that attempt was a largely meaningless abstraction.51 
The current scholarly controversy over how to classify and 
apply the attempt doctrine, therefore, failed to reckon with 
the fact that courts largely ignored the doctrine and the 
debate it had engendered.  
Arnold offered a functional alternative that he claimed 
was based on the work of judges who smartly adapted the law 
to particular cases in order to arrive at fair and administrable 
conclusions.52 They did so by suppressing the desire for a 
separate law of attempt and by focusing instead on the 
relationship between the alleged action in the particular case 
and the underlying substantive crime that the defendant 
allegedly failed to complete, using new attempt statutes to 
“throw all [the conceptual] machinery overboard.”53 Attempt 
to murder should be viewed and evaluated within the ambit 
of the statutory prohibition against murder, attempt to 
commit forgery should be evaluated under the forgery 
statute, and so on.54 Understood this way, the criminal 
attempt doctrine constituted a gap-filling device that would 
allow courts to punish criminally culpable conduct not 
included within a statute’s specific language and not serious 
enough to warrant the full penalty for violating statute.55  
This looks like standard realist stuff, at least in 
Tamanaha’s reconstruction of realism’s rhetoric. While 
Arnold never used the word “formalism” and only once used 
the word “realistic” (in the context of praising trial courts for 
undertaking a “more realistic treatment”),56 he might have 
employed those labels, or at least concepts, more freely if the 
  
 50. Id. at 63-64, 68-70. 
 51. See id. at 78-79. 
 52. See id. at 78. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 77-78. 
 55. See id. at 75-76. 
 56. See id. at 79. 
114 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
article had been published one or two years later. Arnold 
aimed his criticism at the tendencies of commentators and 
appellate courts “to qualify and analyze the useless 
abstractions until they obtain at least an appearance of 
certainty.”57 He continued:  
They do not like to admit frankly that some situations where 
predictability is impossible can be handled more intelligently with 
less logical machinery, rather than with more, because the presence 
of an elaborate set of principles adds an additional and unnecessary 
element of uncertainty by diverting the court’s mind from the real 
question to the rules.58 
He fought a seemingly unseen enemy whose transgressions 
were defined by an ideal of mechanical jurisprudence, 
perpetrated most egregiously by scholarly efforts to tame a 
doctrine that need barely exist at all.  
The true villain of the piece, however, was not a diffuse 
“formalism” but a particular approach to a specific set of 
arguments made by prominent legal academics and 
published in leading law reviews. Although implicitly part of 
a broader theoretical and jurisprudential critique of some 
broader phenomenon, Arnold’s was not a scattershot attack 
on an amorphous school of judging or thought. It was a 
narrow, technical unveiling of a vapid way of handling what 
he viewed as a silly doctrine. Arnold did not see himself as 
Tamanaha portrayed him and his peers—a would-be young 
turk allied with others who built a movement by fabricating 
an enemy who largely did not exist. To the extent that Arnold 
was a realist, he viewed himself on an actual battlefield 
engaged with real competition, among them the nefarious 
Beale.59 
  
 57. Id. at 80. 
 58. Id. 
 59. For examples of the rhetoric surrounding Beale, see JEROME FRANK, LAW 
AND THE MODERN MIND 53-61 (1931) (discussing Beale as “representative of the 
conventional doctrine” of “legal fundamentalism”); Felix S. Cohen, 
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 
833 (1935) (sarcastically listing Beale as one of the leading “classical jurists” and 
“masters of the law”); Walter B. Kennedy, Functional Nonsense and the 
Transcendental Approach, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 272, 282 n.63 (1936) 
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* * * 
The Criminal Attempts article merely marked a middle 
position for Arnold. His next article on criminal law, 
published two years later, critiqued the very functionalism 
which the legal realists seemed to uphold. In Law 
Enforcement—An Attempt at Social Dissection, Arnold 
sought to explain why scholars seemed unable to persuade 
courts and legislatures to adopt their great ideas.60 Its 
primary motivation was not to criticize any particular ideas 
for their abstraction, but to explain to reformers the 
assumptions under which courts and legislatures work.61 
They wrongly assumed that the criminal justice system was 
rational and functional. The substantive criminal law, he 
argued, is an “elaborate . . . attempt to reconcile and make 
more definite the implications of the vague public ideals that 
surround the criminal courts.”62 The resulting criminal code 
crams together an excessive and incoherent array of crimes 
in an effort to further contradictory and incoherent moral and 
cultural ideas.63 The public expects that the enforcement of 
these laws will be strict, mechanical, and impartial, at least 
when the prohibitions are enacted.64 Utilizing the insights 
gleaned from his early empirical work, Arnold explained that 
the public does not get what it wants and assumes is 
occurring. Prosecutors utilize their discretion and the 
relative invisibility of their work in most cases to decide not 
to prosecute everyone who violates a crime, because doing so 
would merely “clog the machinery” of justice “with relentless 
prosecution of comparatively harmless persons.”65 When they 
do prosecute, they rely heavily on plea bargains, all in an 
effort to best allocate their limited resources in a manner that 
  
(characterizing Beale as “the arch-disciple of conceptualistic dogma, say the 
realists,” in an extended, vitriolic critique of realism). 
 60. Thurman W. Arnold, Law Enforcement—An Attempt at Social Dissection, 
42 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1932). 
 61. See id.  
 62. Id. at 7. 
 63. Id. at 7, 14-15. 
 64. See id. at 6-7, 11. 
 65. Id. at 9. 
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can still protect the public from the worst and most 
dangerous criminals.66 As a consequence, quibbles over 
doctrine and efforts to establish logical categories of 
criminally culpable behavior will fail.67 The action and power 
in criminal law reside in a largely lawless, purely 
discretionary system of law enforcement.68 
Arnold’s argument appears to be a realist description of 
a failed formalist system. Rather than offer a transformative 
vision or technical reform to improve the system, he took his 
realist insights in a different direction. The ideal of 
mechanically-applicable criminal laws founded in moral and 
cultural principle, he argued, sits at the core of the criminal 
justice system and will not be displaced by calls for more 
realistic reforms.69 Campaigns to reform must operate within 
the ideal of strict, morally righteous law enforcement—a 
necessary fiction that reformers must use “to accomplish the 
desired ends.”70 The jurisprudence of criminal law (and of law 
generally) is a symptom rather than an explanation, part of 
a range of ideas that “people cling to as social values, and the 
kind of phrases to which they respond.”71 Though untrue, the 
ideals of law enforcement constitute the “personality” of the 
criminal justice system and establish its security by making 
it legitimate to “that part of the public whose acceptance is 
vital to [its] power . . . , and without which it fails.”72 
By this point in his intellectual trajectory, Arnold had 
departed from what is now considered the mainstream of 
legal realism in two respects. His writing no longer 
confidently suggested even the barest of programmatic 
normative outlines. The intuitive wisdom of the trial courts 
offered no significant relief; indeed, in his first monograph 
The Symbols of Government, his characterization of the 
criminal trial was wholly descriptive, critiquing and 
  
 66. Id. at 17-18. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id.  
 69. Id. at 12-14. 
 70. Id. at 13. 
 71. Id. at 23-24. 
 72. Id. at 23. 
2016] LEGAL DOCTRINE 117 
 
satirizing all components of the adjudicative part of the 
criminal justice system, including the attorneys, judge, and 
jury, without providing barely a whiff of a solution.73 All that 
the purely symbolic trial accomplishes is to present criminal 
justice as a procedural drama, one in which procedure itself 
stands as a “great humanitarian ideal”74—even as it 
frequently subverts the pursuit of substantive justice. At the 
same time, the level of abstraction in his work ascended far 
beyond the technical, doctrinal issue that Criminal Attempts 
considered, and well beyond the formalist-realist divide in 
doctrinal debates. Instead, his concern was primarily 
sociological and anthropological, foreshadowing the New 
Left’s cultural and social critiques to come, but without their 
invocation of a radical, transformative political movement. 
Lacking a normative answer and the faith that any 
functional solutions would either win out politically or solve 
the problems they addressed, Arnold had moved beyond the 
realists’ progressive narrative to a kind of tragicomic eternal 
return of symbolic arguments over form and function.  
* * * 
Perhaps the outlying nature of Arnold’s work, and his 
departures from what we view now as the realist norm, make 
him largely irrelevant to all but intellectual historians. From 
our present view, the “realism” of Thurman Arnold (and of 
the other outliers, including Underhill Moore’s parking lot 
study, Llewellyn’s interest in legal anthropology, etc.) has 
simply disappeared in the Darwinian rush of legal theory and 
jurisprudence. In Tamanaha’s narrative, we have moved 
towards a narrower understanding and use of “legal realism” 
and “formalism” to assist us in far more important tasks, like 
developing a contemporary jurisprudence, an analytical 
theory of law, or a theory of judicial behavior. He would 
shrink those categories further, dispensing with them in 
favor of a balanced realism. We can read Arnold out of this 
legal history because the subject is only useful to the extent 
that it serves present concerns and debates. Any stray details 
  
 73. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 128-48 (1935). 
 74. See id. at 143. 
 
118 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
about marginal historical figures, complicating institutional 
histories, or intellectual trajectories can appear in the 
marginal publications of those few who live in the dusky 
twilight thrown off by old bound copies of law reviews (or, 
more likely, the outer reaches of HeinOnline) or, worse, the 
dusty shelves of general university libraries. 
Ironically, of course, the approach that renders Arnold 
superfluous to the realist narrative and to Tamanaha’s 
rejection of that narrative was one of Arnold’s own signature 
moves. He cared little about history too, except insofar as it 
might confirm or be useful for the present purpose of an 
argument he was making. He used the trial of Joan of Arc, 
which received renewed interest during the early 1930s, in 
his discussion of the criminal trial only because it was a 
wonderfully symbolic event, illustrating (at least as Arnold 
recounted it) precisely the argument he wanted to make 
about the empty rituals of criminal procedure.75 Having left 
behind the specific debates of criminal attempt, he had no 
need to actually support his quite broad claims about 
conceptualists who fetishized abstract legal forms and 
reformers who wanted to ignore and sweep away all of the 
outdated doctrine that stood in modernity’s way. He 
presented his own parade of the usable past.  
Unfortunately for Arnold’s reputation, the current, 
accepted version of this parade cares very little for his sort. 
Felix Cohen’s Transcendental Nonsense,76 Karl Llewellyn’s 
work on the UCC,77 and Jerome Frank’s Law and the Modern 
Mind78 are among the small number of canonical works that 
best represent what contemporary scholars want from 
Realism, perhaps alongside Holmes’s The Path of the Law79 
and Cardozo’s The Nature of the Judicial Process,80 old 
  
 75. Id. at 135-41. The transcript of Joan of Arc’s trial had recently appeared in 
an English translation. See THE TRIAL OF JEANNE D’ARC 1-2, 17-18 (G. G. Coulton 
& Eileen Power eds., W. P. Barrett trans., 1931). 
 76. Cohen, supra note 59. 
 77. Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal 
Realism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325 
(1995). 
 78. FRANK, supra note 59. 
 79. O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
 80. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
2016] LEGAL DOCTRINE 119 
 
chestnuts from those considered either predecessors or proto-
realists. These writings are included in course syllabi and 
name-dropped in faculty workshops, their ideals distilled to 
a particular analytical essence and their sources cited in law 
review footnotes when an editor requires support. More 
likely, recent and more probing secondary sources provide a 
summary means to invoke the parade float that realism—
and formalism, for that matter—have become. And Thurman 
Arnold, part of the original parade and himself one of the 
era’s better carnys, barely gets a mention. Rightly so, given 
the current parade’s interests and purposes. This is what 
Tamanaha both critiques and perpetuates, refiguring the 
characters in his own jurisprudential parade of the past.  
CONCLUSION 
At the end of each Mr. Peabody episode, after the title 
character has gotten the last laugh with a terrible pun and 
the animation has faded to black, the transition to the rest of 
the show ran in this way:  
Panning across the busts of famous but unnamed white men from 
various historical eras, the camera finds a live, anonymous looking 
man with a moustache, standing in a garbage can that resembles 
somewhat the pedestals on which the busts sit. It is the same street 
sweeper from the parade. Upon that recognition, he moves his face 
to wag his moustache, changes from his white uniform hat to a 
black bowler, grabs his umbrella, wags his moustache at us again 
in a kind of humorous salute, and then runs out—but not before 
reaching back with an absurdly long arm to flip a blank sign over 
so that it reads, “THE END.” 
The street sweeper is anonymous—a humble, unnoticed 
figure. He follows the great men, sweeping their detritus with 
a sense of purpose and humor. Taking a minimal evaluative 
perspective among self-proclaimed heavyweights of history 
and their self-important evaluator in Mr. Peabody—perhaps 
beyond noticing who is leaving the most refuse—the sweeper 
is empowered to note the parade’s end, but even then does so 
almost as an afterthought. 
Like the street sweeper, intellectual historians are not at 
the center of the legal parade, nor are they part of it in the 
way of traditional legal academics pronouncing on history 
from the perspective of the present and as part of a presently 
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relevant argument. We are marginal to the enterprise. Law 
is aware of and concerned with—indeed at times obsessed 
with—its history. But its understanding of its history, and 
especially of the role of ideas in that history, is ever in the 
service of some other project. At its best, intellectual history 
can clean that up. It does so unnoticed, after the parade has 
moved on. 
 
